People crossing the English Channel in small boats

This briefing examines the phenomenon of people crossing the English Channel in small boats. It reviews what we know about the numbers, characteristics, and motivations of people making this journey.

Around 37,000 people were detected crossing the English Channel in small boats in 2024, 25% more than the year before but fewer than in 2022

The number of small boat arrivals has increased substantially since 2018. While reports of people attempting to enter the UK by crossing the Channel go back over fifty years, significant numbers did not begin to be detected until late 2018.

In 2024, around 37,000 people were detected crossing the Channel in small boats. That was a quarter more than the year before and the second-highest annual figure. In 2022, about 46,000 people crossed the Channel without authorisation (Figure 1).

Arrivals continued to increase in the first five months of 2025. From January to May, there were around 14,800 small boat crossings – the highest ever number for this period, and 42% more than in the same period in 2024. However, it is impossible at the time of writing to say if this indicates a sustained increase for the year. Historically, most crossings have occurred in the summer and autumn.

Figure 1

The majority of those arriving in small boats are men over the age of 18 – around 76% of 2024 arrivals for whom this information was recorded. Another 14% of arrivals were children under 18. These proportions have been stable over time. One reason for the higher share of men is the danger associated with unauthorised migration. In many cases, female and minor children join later through family reunification routes.

Most people who cross the Channel in small boats claim asylum once they are in the UK. In 2024, 99% of all those crossings either applied for asylum or were named as a dependant on an application. Among all arrivals since 2018, the share was 95%.

In recent years, small boat arrivals made up 30-40% of all people applying for asylum in the UK. The number of asylum applications increased sharply since 2020, reaching a record 108,000 in 2024. Only part of this growth is explained by people crossing the Channel by small boat. Data from the Home Office show that a large proportion of asylum seekers – 40% of those applying in 2024 – travelled to the UK legally on a work, study, or visitor visa.

Figure 2

Some people also enter the UK through other unauthorised means, such as in lorries or containers. The sharp rise in small boat crossings means that overall unauthorised arrivals have increased and that small boats now account for more than 80% of detected arrivals (Figure 3; though note that a higher share of boat arrivals are detected compared to other irregular arrivals).

Figure 3

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From 2018 to 2024, citizens of six countries – Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Albania, Syria, and – have made up 70% of those crossing in small boats

A small number of nationalities make up a large share of people crossing the Channel in small boats. From 2018 to 2024, nationals of six countries accounted for 70% of all arrivals – Iran (17%), Afghanistan (15%), Iraq (12%), Albania (10%), Syria (9%), and Eritrea (8%).

The most common nationalities have varied over time (Figure 4). A wide range of factors can shape these trends, including policy changes and developments in origin countries. Afghanistan was the top country of origin for small boat arrivals in both 2023 and 2024. There were also significant numbers of arrivals from Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Eritrea in every year since 2021. Numbers fluctuated more over time for other nationalities. For example, arrivals from Vietnam more than tripled in 2024 compared to the year before.

Most notably, there was a sharp rise in Albanian nationals crossing the Channel in 2022. That sudden increase was the source of political controversy, leading the UK government to respond by fast-tracking asylum and return procedures for Albanians. The number of Albanian nationals arriving by small boat fell from 12,700 in 2022 to less than 1,000 in each of the following years. It is difficult to know how much of this decline resulted from policy as opposed to other factors (for more details, see Albanian asylum seekers in the UK and EU: a look at recent data).

Figure 4

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Between 2018 and 2024, the asylum grant rate for people who arrived by small boat was 68%, higher than the grant rate for all asylum applicants

Since 2018, there have been around 126,000 asylum applications from small boat arrivals to the UK. A quarter – 30,500 applications – were still awaiting an initial decision at the end of 2024.

Excluding withdrawals and administrative decisions, around 68% of all initial decisions on asylum applications from people who arrived by small boat – a total of 47,000 – were grants of protection. That was higher than the grant rate for asylum applications generally, which stood at 57% for the 2018-24 period.

Between 2018 and 2024, around 27,000 asylum applications from small boat arrivals were withdrawn or received an administrative decision (see Understanding the Evidence). While some applications are withdrawn at the request of the applicant, most withdrawals are implicit – they happen if the applicant fails to meet certain conditions, such as attending an interview or responding to Home Office letters within a five-day deadline. A recent inspection of asylum casework raised concerns about the number of asylum applications withdrawn in recent years, highlighting a lack of adequate quality control processes. here is evidence that many people whose asylum applications were initially withdrawn later re-enter the asylum system (for more details, see our briefing, The UK’s asylum backlog).

Figure 5

More than a third of all small boat asylum applications that were withdrawn – around 10,000 – came from Albanian nationals, following a spike in arrivals in 2022 (Figure 6). Approximately 84% of all initial decisions on Albanian applications were withdrawals or administrative decisions. Between 2018 and 2024, only 38 applications from Albanians who arrived on small boats resulted in a grant of protection.

Some of the top nationalities among small boat arrivals have very high asylum grant rates, such as Syrians, Eritreans, and Sudanese. However, others are much more likely to be refused – including Albanians but also citizens of Iraq, Vietnam, Turkey, or India.

Figure 6

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Around 5,000 people who arrived by small boat had been returned from the UK by the end of 2024

Relatively few people who arrived to the UK by crossing the Channel in a small boat were subsequently returned to another country – a total of around 5,000 between 2018 and 2024, or around 3% of all arrivals. However, annual numbers have increased over time. In the same period, around 22,000 asylum applications from small boat arrivals were refused (though this refers to initial decisions and some of these individuals will eventually be granted status on appeal and not become eligible for removal).

Most returns of small boat arrivals have been to Albania – 3,800 or 76% of the total. The government prioritised the processing of Albanian asylum applications after arrivals spiked in 2022, and overall returns to the country increased sharply after a returns agreement was signed the same year.

Figure 7

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In 2024, 73 people died trying to cross the English Channel by small boat, more than in the previous six years combined

Attempts to cross the English Channel by small boat have become more deadly over time. In 2024, there were 73 confirmed deaths related to such crossings – a record number, and five times more than the year before. A total of 147 people died in the Channel between 2018 and April 2025. This rises to 236 when considering other deaths related to migration in the area, such as accidents involving people who try to board lorries bound for the UK. These figures may understate the true toll, as not all incidents are reported.

Two factors may have played a role in the rise in deaths over time, particularly in 2024. One likely factor is that the number of people in each boat has grown significantly, from an average of 13 in 2020 to 53 in 2024. While this partly reflects the use of larger boats by smugglers, reports suggest many boats are used beyond their capacity, making accidents more likely. Another factor could be increased enforcement by the authorities. Beaches in Northern France have been subject to more patrols, meaning that some journeys may have become longer and more dangerous – reports indicate that small boats are more likely to depart from further along the coast, or even canals or rivers inland.

Figure 8

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Increased enforcement of other unauthorised routes and the professionalisation of smuggling gangs have contributed to the rise of small boat crossings

Increased enforcement of other unauthorised modes of entry, such as lorries and trains, is likely to have contributed to the initial rise of the small boat route into the UK. After 2014, the British and French governments invested in enhanced security in and around French ports and the Eurotunnel. Measures included more perimeter fencing, additional CCTV, increased patrols, CO₂ detectors, thermal imaging, and heartbeat monitors. Several organisations have argued these measures led to more people crossing in small boats  – including the UK’s Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, the UN Refugee Agency, and the Institute for Public Policy Research, a think tank.

Another contributing factor has been the expansion of smuggling operations across the Channel. Smuggling groups have become larger and increasingly professionalised in recent years and were able to capitalise on their initial experience as enforcement measures were progressively tightened. There is some evidence that the price of crossing the Channel declined over time, although estimates are uncertain and can vary significantly. According to some sources, prices fell from around €14,000 in 2018 to well under €4,000 in 2024

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People may choose to seek asylum in the UK for a variety of reasons, though their knowledge of asylum policy varies

There is limited evidence on why Channel migrants decide to come to the UK. Several factors appear to play a role in their decision, such as the presence of friends and family members in the UK. The most common nationalities crossing the Channel have larger diaspora populations in the UK rather than France. Other reasons include language and cultural links to the UK, perceptions of the UK as safe and welcoming, as well as negative experiences in other European countries.

Much debate has focused on whether UK policies affect the decisions of those seeking to cross the Channel. In general, academic research finds that small variations in policy between countries are not the most important factor influencing how many people claim asylum in destination countries. Global developments, such as conflict and instability in countries of origin, appear to be more important. Unauthorised migrants’ destination countries may also be influenced in some cases by the decisions of their smugglers.

Research on asylum seekers’ motivations find that they have varying levels of knowledge about the policies that will face them when they arrive or recent changes to such policies. Prospective migrants are generally aware of both the risks involved in an unauthorised journey – such as death, violence, or abuse – and the potential economic benefits of reaching their destination. However, limited information means that many underestimate risks and overestimate their chances of obtaining legal status.

One policy factor that may have influenced people’s decision to cross the Channel is that the UK is no longer part of the Dublin system. Before Brexit, this allowed for some asylum seekers to be returned to their EU country of first arrival, as well as information sharing on asylum applications made in other member states. In interviews, migrants in Northern France often cite the departure from Dublin as a reason for wanting to seek asylum in the UK, particularly if they had already been refused protection in the EU. However, it is unclear how big a role this played in their decision-making. In practice, few people were returned under Dublin when the UK was still a member – an average of 560 a year between 2008 and 2020.

Another argument – made by France’s previous Interior Minister, among others – has been that Britain’s liberal labour market regulations and lack of ID cards attract migrants. However, there is little evidence that the UK’s lack of an ID card system acts as a draw to migrants. As in France, British employers can be fined or imprisoned if they are found to have hired someone without permission to work and did not check their immigration status. In fact, data from the World Bank suggest that the informal economy – which includes many undeclared activities and is likely to rely on the employment of people without work authorisation – is smaller in the UK than in France, relative to the economy.

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Increased enforcement, measures to deter migrants, and the introduction of safe and legal routes are the main types of policies proposed to reduce small-boat crossings

Three main types of policies have been proposed to tackle small boat arrivals in the UK.

First is increased enforcement to disrupt the smuggling networks, thereby restricting the ‘supply’ of smuggling services. The Labour government’s main approach – and its promise to ‘smash the gangs’ – falls into this category. It has introduced several new policies – increased staffing, more cooperation with European police forces, new security agreements with countries such as Iraq and Serbia to tackle smuggling routes, and a new Border Security Command to coordinate investigations. In addition, a new Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill was introduced in Parliament to give authorities expanded powers, such as the ability to search people and seize their belongings more easily. Many of these measures are a continuation of those taken by the previous Conservative government – for example, increased coordination with French authorities and deals with countries such as Albania.

There is some evidence that enforcement can have an impact on the number of people claiming asylum in some settings, although measures to reduce small boat crossings through such means also face challenges. Leaders of smuggling networks tend to operate outside Europe, in countries where there is little international law enforcement cooperation with the UK. When a smuggler is apprehended, they can typically be quickly replaced. There are limited costs involved in setting up a new smuggling operation, and few barriers to entry. Studies have highlighted that smuggling operations across the Channel are not driven by large gangs with centralised control and clear hierarchical structures. Instead, they operate as loose networks with localised operations that specialise in different aspects of the business, such as recruiting migrants or securing equipment. Because of the high demand for crossings, there are strong financial incentives for new actors to fill any gaps created by successful enforcement.

The second type of approach is deterrence – altering the incentives of migrants who want to reach the UK in order to reduce demand for crossings. This was a central focus of previous Conservative governments. Deterrence policies aimed to restrict the rights of asylum seekers after they arrive, such as the Illegal Migration Act 2023 (IMA), which prevented people who entered the UK without authorisation from being granted protection. Most notably, an agreement was signed with Rwanda to relocate asylum seekers there. However, this was delayed by legal challenges, and no asylum seekers were forcibly relocated to Rwanda by the time of the 2024 Election. The scheme was cancelled by Labour, and most provisions of the IMA will be repealed by the new Border Security Bill.

Despite Labour’s initial focus on enforcement, reports emerged in April 2025 that the government was trying to negotiate a new agreement with France, which would allow it to return some people who arrived by small boat, in exchange for accepting asylum seekers who had family ties to the UK. As with the Rwanda scheme, the goal would be to deter people from crossing the Channel in the first place. The deterrent effect of schemes to send asylum seekers either to the EU or to Rwanda would likely depend on the number of asylum seekers relocated there. A significant deterrent effect may require a relatively large number of people arriving by small boat to be removed under the scheme.

Third and finally, civil society proposals have focused on providing ‘safe and legal routes’ for people to claim asylum in the UK, so they do not have to make dangerous crossings by boat. These include creating or expanding refugee resettlement programmes, expanding visa routes for refugees to join family members in the UK, providing additional humanitarian visas, or creating an option to apply for asylum from overseas. There is limited evidence that providing safe and legal routes has a large impact reducing the number of asylum seekers arriving without authorisation. For example, an analysis of US policies facilitating lawful border crossings between 2011 and 2023 found that the practice of allowing a limited number of legal arrivals explained only 9% of the monthly variation in illegal ones. In practice, it is likely that legal routes will reduce the use of unauthorised routes only if they allow a very large number of people to access them. For example, few Ukrainians have been detected crossing the Channel in small boats due to the uncapped visa scheme for this group, whereas Afghans, who have a limited resettlement scheme available to them, have been one of the most common nationalities making the crossing.

Italy, Spain, and Greece experienced more unauthorised arrivals by sea than the UK in 2024

Greece, Italy, and Spain have all received large numbers of people arriving without authorisation by boat since 2014. Italy experienced most irregular arrivals over the Mediterranean in 2024, around 67,000 – though numbers were 58% compared to a year before. Spain received 64,000 people and Greece 54,000. This compares to the approximately 37,000 arrivals over the Channel in the UK.

The number of boat arrivals in other countries has varied widely over time. Yet in recent years, they remained significantly lower than during the refugee crisis of the mid-2010s. Greece and Italy together received more than a million unauthorised sea arrivals in 2015 alone.

Unauthorised crossings in the Mediterranean have led to considerably more deaths than in the English Channel, although the latter route has become more dangerous over time. According to the IOM, around 32,000 died in the Mediterranean between 2014 and 2024. This compared to 332 people who died in and around the English Channel during the same period.

As well as fewer unauthorised arrivals by sea, the UK also receives fewer asylum applications than some other large European countries. In 2024, a record number of 108,000 people applied for asylum in the UK – compared to 251,000 in Germany, 159,000 in Italy, 166,000 in Spain, and 158,000 in France (for more details, see our briefing, Asylum and refugee resettlement in the UK)

Figure 9

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Bilateral deals and enforcement measures may have reduced unauthorised arrivals by sea in some European countries

In response to increases in irregular arrivals by sea, European governments introduced new measures to control migration. This included restrictions on the rights and eligibility of asylum seekers in Greece and Italy, as well as efforts by the Spanish and Italian governments to curtail search-and-rescue operations by humanitarian NGOs. Frontex, the EU’s shared border and coast guard agency, was also significantly expanded after 2015.

However, the main focus has been on reaching bilateral deals with key neighbours. This includes EU agreements with Turkey in 2016, Libya in 2017, Tunisia and Mauritania in 2023, and Egypt in 2024. Further agreements with Jordan and Morocco were being negotiated as of early 2025, after increased cooperation on migration with the latter since 2017.

These deals vary in scale and scope, though have a similar principle at their core: the EU provides direct funding and other assistance – training and equipment for police forces, logistical support, expanded access to visas, or refugee resettlement programmes – while its neighbours promise to control the flow of migrants over the Mediterranean. Some of the measures implemented include crackdowns on smuggling gangs, expanded patrols, and pushbacks at sea by coast guards. Some of the EU’s agreements have been criticised by human rights organisations for contributing to abuse against migrants.

The EU’s bilateral deals may have had some impact in reducing unauthorised migration across the Mediterranean, although the effects are hard to measure. The number of crossings to Italy, Greece, and Spain fell sharply after bilateral agreements were signed — at least initially. However, the number of people arriving by sea has fluctuated in recent years. For example, arrivals in Italy peaked in 2016, declined rapidly after the agreement with Libya was signed in 2017, then rose quickly between 2021 and 2023 – only to fall again in 2024 after another agreement was reached with Tunisia, where many of the previous routes from Libya had relocated. However, it is difficult to determine exactly how much of these declines were due to changes in policy, as opposed to other factors.

Acknowledgements

With thanks to CJ McKinney for assisting with a previous update.